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aBstract: This paper focuses on the phenomenon of morally respectful listening. I 
defend a specific requirement for respectful listening in the context of disagreement. 
According to it, when listening occurs in the context of disagreement, the morally 
respectful listener must be open to the possibility that the speaker will surprise the 
listener with her positive epistemic qualities. That is, the listener must be open to 
what I call “epistemic surprise.” I also argue for a specific interpretation of this 
openness: to be open to epistemic surprise is to be open to unexpected changes in 
confidence levels concerning the proposition in question. I close by arguing that 
respectful listening is incompatible with a listener’s being certain, and I apply this 
conclusion to three recent debates in epistemology to show that the phenomenon of 
listening has potentially far-reaching consequences for epistemology.
One of the distinctive features of the current political climate is tendency to 
demonize one’s opponents. For example, progressives and conservatives 
regularly view each other as both morally and epistemically vicious. This 
phenomenon is also increasingly found in professional philosophy. For 
example, recent debates surrounding the nature of gender or the justice of 
affirmative action prove to be especially polarizing, and with this polariza-
tion has come demonization. It is in this context of polarization and demo-
nization that some—both within the profession and outside of it—have 
emphasized the need to engage respectfully with the other side, to listen to 
one’s opponent even when one disagrees vehemently with the content of 
their claims. I agree with this sentiment, up to a point. But that is not the 
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purpose of this paper. Rather, its purpose is to examine the concept of 
respectful listening itself.1
To start, there are at least two distinct kinds of respectful listening and 
it is important to distinguish them. The first is what we might call epistem-
ically respectful listening. It consists in the respect that one gives the speaker 
in virtue of the speaker’s perceived positive epistemic qualities. For exam-
ple, when I listen attentively to an expert, I do so primarily with epistemic 
respect—I think highly of the speaker given her greater knowledge on the 
issue in question. The second kind of respectful listening is what we might 
call morally respectful listening. This kind of listening consists in a respect 
that one gives the speaker in virtue of some perceived morally relevant 
quality that she possesses, such as the fact that the speaker is a moral agent. 
The two kinds of respectful listening might come apart. For example, one 
might want to listen respectfully to a friend or family member out of a 
sense of loyalty even though the friend or family member is seen to lack 
positive epistemic qualities. So, there is an important difference between 
listening with epistemic respect and listening with moral respect. The 
former intends to track a speaker’s qualities as a knower, while the latter 
intends to track a speaker’s qualities as a member of the moral 
community.2
This paper will focus exclusively on the phenomenon of morally respect-
ful listening (“respectful listening” hereafter).3 There are of course many 
components of respectful listening. First, there are behavioral components. 
For example, a respectful listener does not check her phone, interrupt fre-
quently, or whistle show tunes while listening. Second, there are attentional 
components. Even if a listener is outwardly well behaved, he falls short of 
respectful listening if he is mentally compiling a grocery list while the 
speaker is speaking. Third, there are judgmental components. For example, 
even if a listener is outwardly well behaved and attending to the speaker’s 
utterances, she is plausibly not listening with respect if she is thinking to 
1 It is, after all, difficult to decide whether one should listen respectfully without first 
knowing what it involves.
2 The two kinds of respect can overlap, for example, in the case of listening to a perceived 
moral authority.
3 Discussions of listening often occur in the context of political listening. Mill (1859), for 
instance, argues that a duty to listen can protect against tyranny. See Day (1996) and Heldke 
(2007) for discussion. The issue also arises in discussions of public reason and deliberative 
democracy. Morgan-Olsen (2013), for instance, argues that there is a civic duty to listen to 
others which should be understood as a duty to seek public justifications in their political 
arguments. Recent defenses of listening as a moral virtue include Notess (2019), Beatty (1999), 
and English (2016).
54 GALEN BARRY
herself the whole time that the speaker is an absolute idiot.4 Instead of try-
ing to account for all the possible components of respectful listening, I will 
defend a specific requirement for respectful listening: what I call the Openness 
Requirement. It is a requirement that applies to listening in contexts of dis-
agreement, which is any context in which the listener’s confidence level in 
a given proposition differs from that of the speaker.5 According to the 
Openness Requirement, when listening occurs in the context of disagree-
ment, the morally respectful listener must be open to the possibility that the 
speaker will surprise the listener with her positive epistemic qualities. The 
Openness Requirement, as we will see, is open to interpretation. I will 
argue for a specific interpretation: in the context of disagreement, the 
respectful listener must be open to unexpected changes in her confidence 
levels concerning the proposition in question. A quick preview is in order. 
In section 1, I argue that part of what is involved in being worthy of 
respect, qua person, is having the capacity to surprise others in good ways. 
I then defend a specific kind of surprise, which I call “epistemic surprise.” 
It involves the capacity of a person to unexpectedly cause others to think 
more highly of her epistemic qualities. I argue that respectful listening must 
track the capacity a speaker has to epistemically surprise the speaker. In 
section 2, I defend the specific interpretation of the Openness Requirement 
mentioned above. In section 3, I argue that respectful listening is incompat-
ible with a listener’s being certain. So, in cases of certainty there can be a 
moral reason not merely to be open to changes in confidence levels, but to 
actually lower one’s confidence levels. Finally, in section 4, I apply the con-
clusions surrounding respectful listening to three recent debates in episte-
mology to show that the phenomenon of listening has potentially far-reaching 
consequences.
1. EPISTEMIC SURPRISE AND THE BASIS OF RESPECT
The kind of respect I have in mind throughout this paper is what Darwall 
(1977) labels “recognition respect.”6 Recognition respect “consists, most 
generally, in a disposition to weigh appropriately in one’s deliberations 
4 This is why merely entertaining a speaker’s utterances is plausibly insufficient for re-
spectful listening. See Kriegel (2013) for an in-depth discussion of entertaining as an attitude. 
See Notess (2019) for an account of listening as a virtue of attention.
5 I frame disagreement in terms of differing confidence levels because disagreements can 
occur even when two people have the same beliefs toward the proposition in question.
6 It is essentially a moral attitude (40). See Cranor (1975,1982), Rawls (2000), Dillon 
(2018) Wood (2010), and Birch (1993) for discussion of recognition respect and cognates.
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some feature of the thing in question and to act accordingly” (38). In other 
words, respect involves tracking some respect-worthy feature of a thing or 
person. Of course, this respect need not occur only in deliberation. It can 
occur in the attitudes one holds, such as how one views a thing or person.7 
But in both cases, respect tracks a feature of the thing or person owed 
respect. So, we should expect that respectful listening will track some 
respect-worthy feature or other of the speaker; constructing an account of 
respectful listening requires identifying those features which the listening 
tracks.
I will focus on what I take to be two features of speakers that are worthy 
of respect: their autonomy and their potential for valuable uniqueness 
(“uniqueness” hereafter).8 The first feature is well known as a basis of 
respect: a person is owed respect because he or she is an autonomous being 
with control over many of aspects of their actions and mental life. The 
second feature, however, is less discussed.9 The basic idea is that a person 
is owed respect because his or her mental life potentially differs in valuable 
ways from that of other people. For example, a person might have a novel 
perspective on a thing or an activity, or feel certain emotions that others do 
not feel (or feel them more intensely), or value a thing or activity for reasons 
that others do not, and so on. Of course, the mere fact that someone is 
unique might not be a sufficient basis for respect. A person or thing, after 
all, might be uniquely bad. What I am claiming is that a basis of respect is 
the potential a person has for valuable uniqueness. No doubt the first basis 
of respect—autonomy—has played a more central role in the history of 
philosophy, but the role that uniqueness plays in grounding respect can be 
seen in at least two ways. First, consider how uniqueness functions in con-
cerns about conservation. For example, the fact that an artwork, or ecosys-
tem, or historical artifact, is unique gives us more reason to weigh it in our 
deliberations than if it were just one of many like it. Artworks, ecosystems, 
and historical artifacts are not autonomous, so if there is a need to respect 
these things, then it cannot be due to their autonomy.10 Furthermore, it is 
not the mere possession of valuable features that explains the drive to 
7 Murdoch (1970, ch. 1) contains a classic defense of the moral importance of perception 
of others.
8 Rini (2018, 5) uses the notion of reciprocity to defend an imperfect duty to be open to 
moral persuasion. On her account, we have a duty to listen to others (some of the time) 
because we stand in a relation of reciprocity.
9 See Zagzebski (2001) for discussion of uniqueness. Citation: Zagzebski, Linda. “The 
Uniqueness of Persons.” Journal of Religious Ethics 29 (3) (2001): 401–23. 
10 It is of course controversial whether nonautonomous things are deserving of respect. 
See Birch (1993) for a case that nature deserves respect.
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conservation—if it were, then we would expect similar levels of conserva-
tion efforts to be aimed at things with equal value, regardless of their 
uniqueness. Instead, we see that unique things are prioritized, other things 
being equal. The second way to see the role that uniqueness plays in respect 
is to consider how dismissal of others’ uniqueness suffices for disrespect. For 
example, imagine dismissing a person’s preferences for being different from 
your own. It is natural, I believe, to think that this dismissal involves a dis-
respectful attitude (we can imagine that the dismissal does not harm the 
person). But the dismissal is a dismissal of uniqueness: to assume that people 
have roughly identical inner lives precludes the possibility that a person 
might actually be unique in some way. For the sake of this paper, I will 
assume that autonomy and uniqueness are adequate bases of respect.
I want to argue that autonomy and uniqueness involve a special capacity 
to surprise others. It is this capacity to surprise that will form the backbone 
of my account of respectful listening. One person surprises another, in the 
sense meant here, when the following three conditions are met:
1. he/she does something that is, given the available evidence at 
the time of the act, unexpected;
2. the act leads an observer to think more highly of him/her, in the rel-
evant respect; and
3. that the act was unexpected cannot be explained entirely by a lack of 
familiarity with the person in question.
The basic idea behind (1) and (2) is that autonomous and unique creatures 
can do the unexpected, and it can make one think more highly of them as a 
result.11 That is, autonomous, unique creatures are potentially unexpected 
sources of good things, whether those are actions, perspectives, emotions, etc. 
After all, an autonomous creature’s activity is not simply the outcome of a 
causal process the way that a machine’s activity is, and so it might do some-
thing that is not expected on the basis of causal processes. Similarly, a unique 
creature’s activity will sometimes have a source that an observer does not 
have access to, and so it will do something unexpected on those occasions. 
The basic idea behind (3) that there is an important distinction between (i) 
acts that are unexpected due to something merely accidental and (i) those 
that are unexpected due to something essential about the agent. Consider a 
case of playing basketball with someone for the first time. You might think, 
because of the person’s weight and age, that he is not a particularly good 
11 A person might also do something unexpected, which makes others think less of them. 
But that is a separate phenomenon.
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player. If he turns out to be quite good, then his play was unexpected given 
the evidence, and you think more highly of his basketball-playing abilities. 
But the fact that you did not expect him to be good was merely because you 
did not know him very well. You never played basketball with him, and so 
did not know of his abilities. Condition (3) is meant to rule out cases like 
these as cases of surprise in the sense I am after. The kind of surprise I am 
trying to capture is possible no matter how familiar one is with the person in 
question. One way that the capacity to surprise can persist in the face of 
familiarity is if the capacity arises out of the person’s autonomy and/or 
uniqueness. That is, no matter how well one knows an autonomous or 
unique individual, they might still do something unexpected.
Surprise can also take on different forms and need not occur in the con-
text of listening. First, there is conceptual surprise. This kind of surprise 
occurs when a person does something unexpected that induces in one the 
realization that the concepts one uses to capture one’s own life (one’s activ-
ities, experiences, and so on) are not adequate to capture those of the other 
person. Conceptual surprise involves, to co-opt the words of D. W. 
Winnicott, the “recognition of an outside reality that is not one’s own pro-
jection, the experience of contacting other minds.”12 A second form of 
surprise is moral surprise. Moral surprise occurs when the unexpected act 
causes an observer to think more highly of the person’s moral qualities.13 
Moral surprise often occurs in cases of redemption. For example, a person 
who has lived his whole life in a consistently selfish way—using others when 
it suits him, with little independent regard for their welfare—might none-
theless unexpectedly alter his path later in life and start to put others first.14 
A third kind of surprise is emotional surprise. It occurs when one does some-
thing to cause another to think more highly of his or her emotional capac-
ities. For example, all evidence might point to a friend’s being emotionally 
12 Quoted in Benjamin (1988, 37). Many so-called “continental” figures seem to have 
something like conceptual surprise in mind when they speak of encounters with the “Other.” 
For example, Levinas says that “the Other as Other is not an alter ego” (1987, 83), while 
Marion (2002) talks about the phenomenon of conceptual saturation that occurs when the 
experience of another person goes beyond the concepts we have. See Gordon (2011) for a 
discussion of “listening to the Other” in Buber.
13 An openness to moral surprise is similar in ways to Preston-Roedder’s (2013) notion of 
“faith in humanity.” Two differences, however, are worth noting. First, his notion of faith in 
humanity seems to lack anything analogous to epistemic surprise. Second, the attitude of 
openness is plausibly less committal than that of faith.
14 Some cases of moral surprise are internal insofar as the surprising “act” is a mental 
one. For example, one might come to see something in a more morally appropriate light. An 
interesting case of this occurs in the documentary The Act of Killing when a particularly glib 
individual who had helped in the Indonesian genocide experiences an epiphany and comes 
to see that what he had done was deeply evil (that he had “sinned”).
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superficial and yet she might do something that reveals real emotional 
depth. There are probably many other kinds of surprise that can be traced 
to the autonomy and/or uniqueness of persons. But the one I want to focus 
on is what I call epistemic surprise. It occurs when the agent does something 
unexpected that causes others to think more highly of the agent’s specifi-
cally epistemic qualities, such as his habits of mind, possession of evidence, or 
intuitive capacities (to name just three epistemic qualities).15 For example, a 
student whose work you have grown familiar with over several semesters 
might surprise you with a paper; for example, it goes well beyond the medi-
ocrity you had come to expect. In such a case, all three conditions of sur-
prise are met: he did something that was unexpected given the evidence, 
you think more highly of his epistemic abilities (e.g., his ability to craft an 
argument), and the unexpectedness was not due to insufficient familiarity 
with the student (perhaps he has taken multiple classes over several years 
with you).
It is possible that one person could surprise another without the observer 
conceiving of it as arising out of a person’s autonomy and/or uniqueness. 
For example, the observer could be surprised by a person’s epistemic qual-
ities, but conceive of it as due to unexpected cleverness of the sort one could 
replicate in a machine. His surprise in this case is not conceived of as aris-
ing from the bases of respect. This is possible because the notion of surprise 
is not defined in terms of its conceived cause. But surprise, including epis-
temic surprise, can be conceived of as arising from a person’s uniqueness or 
autonomy. One conceives of the student’s unexpected act as arising out of 
his autonomy when, for example, he is conceived of as freely deciding to 
put in the intellectual legwork for the first time. Likewise, the surprise is 
conceived of as arising out of his uniqueness when, for example, the paper’s 
thesis is conceived of as the result of a unique perspective that he has.16 To 
use another example, a relative whom you have come to doubt can contrib-
ute to a productive conversation might nonetheless offer an insightful com-
ment at a holiday dinner, and the insightful comment could be conceived 
of as a result of her unique perspective on the issue, a perspective which 
provided her with new sources of relevant information on a topic. Or per-
haps the surprise is conceived of as the result of a free decision to pursue a 
line of reasoning for longer than she usually does. One conceives of an 
15 Epistemic and conceptual surprise can at times overlap, for example, if the conceptu-
ally unique perspective is epistemically relevant.
16 The diversity trumps ability theorem is controversial, but, if true, it plausibly works on 
the basis of diversity offering additional information on the basis of additional unique per-
spectives. See Anderson (2006) for discussion.
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instance of surprise in a respect-relevant manner when one conceives it as 
arising out of the bases of respect.
Let us return to the issue of respectful listening. Respectful listening, I 
have argued, is a recognition of those features of a person that ground her 
respect-worthiness, namely, a person’s autonomy and uniqueness.17 
Furthermore, autonomy and uniqueness ground a capacity to surprise oth-
ers, so respectful listening requires tracking that capacity. Different contexts 
of listening make salient different kinds of surprise.18 For example, listening 
to a prisoner’s appeal for parole requires attending to his capacity to mor-
ally surprise others. In the context of disagreement, one’s epistemic qualities 
become salient. Insofar as the speaker’s epistemic qualities are salient, 
respectful listening in that context requires that one track a person’s capac-
ity to epistemically surprise. This is the Openness Requirement. In the next 
section 1 will argue for a particular interpretation of it.
2. THE OPENNESS REQUIREMENT
In this section 1 will defense a specific interpretation of the Openness 
Requirement on listening. Independent of context, a person might epis-
temically surprise another in all sorts of ways. For example, a child might 
surprise a parent with the concepts she has, a student might surprise an 
instructor with his work, an elderly person might surprise her kids with her 
memory, and so on. The list is as long as the list of epistemic qualities. But 
in the context of disagreement, a speaker is offering arguments, making 
objections, asking questions, and so on, regarding the appropriate confi-
dence toward some proposition p. So, the respectful listener must track the 
capacity of the speaker to offer an unexpected argument, ask an unexpected 
question, make an unexpected objection, and so on, regarding the appro-
priate confidence toward p. Furthermore, the listener must be open to the 
possibility that the unexpected thing—argument, objection, etc.—leads her 
to think more highly of the speaker’s epistemic qualities. What precisely 
this openness involves is unclear, at least at this stage. It will help to start 
with an example that is plausibly disrespectful despite the listener being open 
to some sort of epistemic surprise. Once it becomes clear why the example 
involves disrespect, we can better understand what openness to epistemic 
surprise involves.
17 Technically, respectful listening is the attribution of those features. But for ease of style, 
I will write as if those features are in fact instantiated in the speaker.
18 See Rice (2011) for a discussion of some different listening contexts.
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Suppose you are an advisor of a thesis and you are about to meet with 
the student to discuss his work. As the meeting is about to start, you think 
the following to yourself:
James is really unimpressive as a thinker. I expect that I’ll leave this meeting with 
the same impression. I’m willing to bet on it, if necessary. But I want to give him a 
chance. So, I will open myself up to the possibility that he will do something that, 
contrary to my expectations, will prove him to be a merely unimpressive thinker 
rather than a really unimpressive one.
In this example, you are tracking his capacity to do something unexpected 
such that you think more highly of his epistemic qualities as a result. But it 
seems unlikely that you are preparing yourself to listen with respect. Why? 
Because what you are open to is an insufficient improvement, namely, an 
improvement from seeing him as being really unimpressive to seeing him as 
just run-of-the-mill unimpressive. The notion of epistemic surprise was 
intended to capture the idea that a person has something that makes him 
or her worthy of respect (their uniqueness and autonomy). But in the exam-
ple above, the range within which you are willing to move your evaluation 
is an entirely negative range: you are willing to change your initial negative 
evaluation to a slightly less negative evaluation. Insofar as you remain in the 
negative range, you have not yet tracked anything worthy of respect. For 
example, one would never cite being a bad x as a reason that a person ought 
to be respected, even if being a bad x is a better quality than being a really bad 
x. So, being open to a person’s being a bad thinker (rather than being a 
really bad thinker) is insufficient for respecting them.19 Autonomy and 
uniqueness are worthy of respect only insofar as they ground potentially 
good things—interesting perspectives, freely chosen good acts, and so on. By 
keeping your range of possible evaluation entirely in the negative—even if 
you are open to improvements—you have not tracked anything worthwhile 
about James. So, your attitude is morally disrespectful (even if epistemically 
justified).
What can we glean from this example of disrespect? At least this: respect-
ful listening requires an openness to the possibility not only that you will 
think more highly of the speaker in unexpected ways, but that the range of 
possible improvement extends into the positive realm. For example, you 
must be open to the possibility that James will not only unexpectedly cause 
you to think more highly of him, but he will unexpectedly cause you to 
19 Consider analogies of other kinds of surprise: being merely kind of glib, being merely 
kind of selfish, and so on.
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think he is a good thinker, or that he has something interesting to say, or that 
he is insightful, or that he is careful, and so on. Tracking the capacity to sur-
prise must therefore involve an openness to an unexpected improved and 
overall positive evaluation of a person’s epistemic qualities. Call this the 
Positivity Requirement on respectful listening.20
With the Positivity Requirement in mind, we can return to the Openness 
Requirement. I offer the following interpretation: respectful listening 
requires an openness to the capacity to surprise and, in the context of dis-
agreement, this requires an openness to unexpected changes in one’s own 
confidence levels concerning the proposition in question.21 In other words, to 
be open to being epistemically surprised by what someone you disagree 
with says, you must be open to having what they say change your confi-
dence levels in unexpected ways. More precisely:
for any listener A and speaker B who differ in their confidence that p, A listens 
respectfully to B only if A is open to the scenario in which the difference between 
A’s and B’s respective confidence levels that p is less after listening to B than 
the difference which A expected on the basis of what A knew about B prior to 
listening.
Two quick points of clarification are in order. First, someone is open in this 
sense only if (i) the scenario of unexpected confidence change is consistent 
with everything the listener knows at the time of listening, (ii) the listener 
knows this, and (iii) the listener would in fact change his or her confidence 
levels if the speaker says the appropriate things. Some dogmatic thinkers are 
open in the sense of (i) but not in the sense of (ii) or (iii). Some formerly 
dogmatic thinkers were, in their state of dogmatism, open in the sense of (i) 
and (iii), but not (ii). Second, my interpretation of the Openness Requirement 
does not require that one expect to change his confidence levels. Rather, all 
it says is that one must be open to unexpected changes in confidence. Of 
course, this assumes that we enter a context of disagreement with expecta-
tions, perhaps imprecise, about how our confidence levels will change as a 
result of what the other person says. But I do not think this assumption is 
20 It is in fact a requirement for any attitude that tracks respect-based surprise.
21 The notion of a confidence level is usually understood in terms of degrees of belief or 
credence. For example, the typical person has a credence of 0.5 on a given coin flip that it 
will turn up heads. Their confidence in a heads result is no greater than their confidence in 
a tails result. Descartes’s meditator has a credence of 1 that he exists and a credence of 0 that 
he does not. I will sometimes talk about confidence levels in terms of credence, but this is 
only for the sake of simplicity. If one prefers a merely qualitative notion of confidence, then 
what I have to say for the rest of the paper still stands mutatis mutandis. See Horgan (2017) for 
a recent critique of the notion of a credence.
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problematic. Sometimes we expect no changes in confidence. For example, 
when a stranger comes to my door to discuss religion, I expect that my 
confidence will not change even if I give him a chance to make his case. 
Sometimes we expect the confidence to shift in the direction of the speak-
er’s confidence. For example, if I am only mildly confident that one of the 
fundamental physical forces is the weak nuclear force and I go down the 
hall to ask a physicist, I expect that my confidence level will move in the 
direction of hers after listening to her (though maybe not to the exact level 
of hers, since I realize I might not understand the terms I am using or I do 
not have access to her evidence). There might even be cases when we 
expect our confidence to move away from that of the speaker. For example, 
if there is a person who is known to believe false things, then we should 
expect that sometimes our confidence will move in the opposite direction of 
his after conversing with him.22
I offer an argument by analogy in defense of this interpretation of the 
Openness Requirement. Suppose that you wronged your friend and are 
attempting to redeem yourself. Specifically, you work to improve on those 
qualities whose deficiency was the cause of your wronging your friend. 
For example, you work to increase your compassion and decrease your 
selfishness. Now suppose that your friend is expecting you to attempt to 
redeem yourself, but she has put a cap on what she thinks you are capable 
of with regard to improvement. Namely, she expects that any reduction 
in selfishness will be only temporary and that you will return to your old 
ways in short order. As a result, any attempt you make to show her that 
your changes are actually more permanent gets interpreted by her as just 
more quick fixes by you. What can we say of her? At the very least, we 
can say that her attitude is dismissive; specifically, she is dismissing your 
capacity to redeem yourself. It is not that she thinks the act you committed 
is irredeemable. Rather, she thinks you cannot redeem yourself for it, at 
least not fully. Furthermore, it is not merely that she does not expect you to 
redeem yourself; rather, she has dismissed the possibility out of hand. But by 
dismissing your capacity for redemption, she has precluded the possibility 
22 There is at least one kind of limit case to my interpretation of the Openness 
Requirement: omniscience. First, an omniscient listener likely cannot be surprised by any-
thing, let alone surprised in such a way that it changes its confidence levels in unexpected 
ways. Second, a person who perceives the speaker as omniscient, at least on a given topic, 
cannot be open to unexpected changes in confidence. After all, such a person will expect to 
change their confidence levels to meet exactly those of the speaker, as long as they are per-
ceived as omniscient. I do not think either of these involves disrespect, however. Rather, lis-
tening in cases involving omniscience is likely just very different from cases involving fallible 
creatures.
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that you will morally surprise her. After all, unexpected redemption is a 
cause of moral surprise: it causes one to unexpectedly think more highly of 
the redeemed person’s moral qualities. Insofar as she has closed herself off 
to moral surprise, she fails to fully recognize the respect-worthy feature(s) of 
you that gives rise to the capacity to moral surprise. A failure to recognize 
a respect-worthy feature is disrespect, and your friend therefore disrespects 
you.
Now consider someone who fails to meet the Openness Requirement 
when listening to you. He has closed himself off to the possibility of unex-
pected confidence changes. This closure does not mean that he is not open 
to changes in his confidence levels—he may or may not be. But he is at 
least closed to unexpected changes in confidence. I think that this person has 
dismissed you in a way similar to your dismissive friend. If he is not open 
to adjusting his confidence more than he expects to, then when he listens 
to you, he is essentially saying that your epistemic abilities are just what he 
says they are. You have no more to offer him regarding the truth of p than 
what he has bookmarked you as offering him. As such, he has dismissed any 
unexpected contributions you might make. This dismissive attitude is an 
instance of disrespect, for the same reason the friend who dismisses your 
redemptive capacities counts as disrespecting you. Namely, they both have 
closed themselves off to surprise. One cannot close oneself off to surprise 
without thereby ignoring the features of a person that lead to a capacity to 
surprise: autonomy and uniqueness. A person who thinks you cannot epis-
temically surprise him cannot think, for example, that your autonomy led 
you to pursue a line of reasoning that he did not pursue or that you have 
a unique take on the issue that he has not considered. So, failure to be open 
to unexpected confidence change entails disrespect.23
One might object at this point that it is possible to be open to epis-
temic surprise without being open to unexpected changes in one’s confidence. 
Suppose, for instance, that the speaker says something unexpected which 
makes the listener reevaluate the speaker’s reasons for believing differently 
than the speaker does. The listener comes to think that the speaker has 
better reasons for her belief than the listener had anticipated. If the rea-
sons are judged to be overall good reasons—so as to satisfy the Positivity 
Requirement—then the listener looks to have unexpectantly come to think 
more highly of the speaker’s epistemic qualities. After all, the speaker is now 
seen by the listener to have good reasons for her belief when beforehand she 
23 In the next section, I will consider one exception, that is, a case where closing oneself 
off to unexpected changes in confidence does not suffice for disrespect.
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did not. In this case the listener looks to satisfy the Openness Requirement 
without necessarily being open to unexpected changes in her confidence lev-
els. Call this interpretation of the Openness Requirement the good reasons 
account: one tracks the capacity for epistemic surprise by being open to 
hearing unexpected good reasons in support of the speaker’s views.
Whether the good reasons account succeeds depends on the relationship 
between good reasons and confidence levels. That is, it succeeds only if 
there can be good reasons that do not affect the confidence levels of those 
who see the reasons as good. The account can, of course, admit that some-
times there is a connection between attributing a good reason to someone 
and changing one’s confidence level on the basis of that attribution. 
Consider evidential reasons. Good evidential reasons that p are reasons to 
think that p is true or likely to be true.24 So, if the listener unexpectedly 
attributes to the speaker a good evidential reason that p, then the speaker 
must change his confidence level regarding p from what it was prior to lis-
tening. After all, he now recognizes new evidence and evidence has a direct 
bearing on truth. What the good reasons account needs, then, is to high-
light a nonevidential reason that fulfills three conditions: (i) the listener is 
open to attributing it to the speaker, (ii) the attribution leads the listener to 
think more highly of the speaker’s epistemic qualities, and (iii) attributing it 
to the speaker does not require lowering one’s confidence that the speaker 
is wrong.
Here is the problem. The possession of nonevidential reasons for a given 
doxastic attitude, such as pragmatic or moral reasons, are not epistemic qual-
ities of a person. Rather, they are pragmatic or moral qualities. For exam-
ple, if you have a moral reason to believe that your friend did not commit 
the crime he is accused of, then possessing that reason is a moral quality 
you possess, not an epistemic quality. Similarly, if you have a pragmatic 
reason to believe that you will defeat cancer in order to maintain the will 
to fight the cancer, then possessing that reason is perhaps an importance 
feature of you, but not an epistemic one. As such, nonevidential reasons of 
the moral and pragmatic variety cannot be used to explain a case of epis-
temic surprise—they at most explain some other variety of surprise, such as 
moral surprise. Unless there is some other variety of nonevidential reason 
that fulfills the three conditions in the previous paragraph, the good rea-
sons account fails: attributing a good epistemic reason to a speaker requires 
changes one’s confidence that the speaker is wrong.
24 Consider the Bayesian conception of evidence: E is evidence for hypothesis H if and 
only if P(H/E) > P(H).
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The natural strategy for the defender of the good reasons account is to 
try to argue that there are nonevidential epistemic reasons. This strategy is 
not entirely unpromising. Nowadays, many philosophers grant that there 
are at least nonevidential epistemic factors. These nonevidential factors fall 
into two broad categories: truth-relevant and truth-irrelevant factors. In the 
truth-relevant category are those factors that have some bearing on the 
truth of a doxastic attitude, but that do not qualify as evidence. For exam-
ple, the reliability of a person’s belief- and confidence-forming processes 
have some bearing on the truth (more reliable processes produce more true 
attitudes), and yet they are nonevidential.25 In the truth-irrelevant category 
are practical factors that do not have a bearing on the truth of an attitude, 
but instead affect the threshold for whether the attitude is justified. For 
example, on some pragmatist accounts higher stakes raise the threshold for 
when a belief is justified.26 In other words, that a lot rides on whether a 
belief is true raises the threshold for its justification. More recently, some 
philosophers argued that moral considerations are relevant in the same 
way.27 That is, if a belief has potentially immoral content, then more is 
required to justify it. For example, that a belief represents people of differ-
ent races as being cognitively unequal raises the threshold for its justifica-
tion. If these nonevidential factors qualify as epistemic in nature—and I will 
assume that they do—then they might be used to defend the good reasons 
account.
I do not think this strategy is promising, however. Let supporters of the 
good reasons account countenance any of the nonevidential factors from 
the previous paragraph. Either the nonevidential factor is truth-related, or 
it is not. If it is truth-related, then attributing it to the speaker will inevitably 
change one’s confidence. For example, if you attribute to the speaker a 
reliable belief-forming process that you did not think she had before you 
listened to her, then your confidence that p will inevitably shift towards her 
confidence that p. After all, reliable representation-forming processes tend 
to produce true attitudes, or at least raise the likelihood of a true attitude. 
The strategy fares no better if the attributed feature is a truth-irrelevant 
factor. First, if the nonevidential factor is not truth-relevant, then it cannot 
be a good reason for the speaker’s confidence level.28 Non-truth-relevant 
25 Facts about reliability are not evidential, since a person might not have access to facts 
about reliability and yet they have access to all their evidence (by definition).
26 Stanley (2005) is the classic piece representing this position.
27 See Gardiner (2018) for a good overview of this “moral encroachment” view.
28 See Grimm (2011) for a defense of the distinction between goal-oriented and thresh-
old-oriented epistemic factors.
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factors, such as the high stakes of a situation or the potentially immoral 
content of an attitude, function only to raise the threshold for justification. 
They do not function as a reason for doxastic attitudes themselves.29 For 
example, the fact that a scenario is high stakes does not function as a reason 
to believe anything, or to disbelieve anything, or to have confidence in 
anything. Rather, it functions only to raise the bar for the attitude’s justifi-
cation. So even if one attributes to the speaker the nonevidential epistemic 
factor that she is in a high (or low) stakes situation, it will be irrelevant in 
itself to your evaluation of her reasons for her confidence level. The same is 
true of moral considerations. That a proposition has moral content might 
affect whether an attitude is justified. For example, if you are wondering 
whether a suspect committed a crime, the fact that she is your friend might 
raise the bar for justification.30 But the fact that she is your friend is not, by 
itself, good reason to be less confident that she is guilty (though the fact that 
she is your friend might serve as a proxy for evidence that she is innocent). 
Second, it seems rather odd to think of these sorts of nonevidential epis-
temic factors as good qualities of a person of the sort that are involved in 
surprise. They are often just neutral qualifies. Furthermore, they are not 
even qualities of a person in most cases. For example, high stakes are fea-
tures of situations and not of persons. So even if one recognizes the pres-
ence of these factors when listening to a speaker, it is difficult to see how 
they could cause the listener to think more highly of the speaker's epistemic 
qualities.
So, the good reasons account fails. If the reason for p that one attributes 
to the speaker on the basis of listening is recognized as a good epistemic 
reason, then the confidence level of the listener requires changing. The 
general challenge for those who accept the Openness Requirement but who 
deny my interpretation of it is as follows. They need to describe a scenario 
where the speaker does something unexpected which causes an the listener 
to think more highly of her epistemic qualities, the epistemic quality is over-
all positive and not just less worse than the previously attributed qualities; 
and yet the good epistemic quality has no bearing whatsoever on the truth 
of the proposition in question.31 Absent meeting this challenge, it seems that 
29 Nonepistemic factors might indirectly lead one to suspend belief about the truth or falsity 
of the proposition. For example, they might lead one to recognize that the belief is not justi-
fied, due to a higher threshold for justification, and that the rational thing to do is to suspend 
belief.
30 See Baker (1987) and Stroud (2006) for discussion.
31 Even virtue epistemologists, who treat epistemic qualities as broadly moral qualities 
tend to construe epistemic qualities in truth-related terms. For example, Zagzebski (2003) 
claim the chief epistemic virtue is the love of truth.
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the Openness Requirement is best understood as openness to unexpected 
changes in confidence.
3. THE OPENNESS REQUIREMENT AND CERTAINTY
Respectful listening requires openness to unexpected confidence change. 
But a requirement to be open to unexpected confidence change is not itself 
a requirement to change one’s confidence when listening. So, the Openness 
Requirement does not, by itself, provide any reason to change one’s con-
fidence levels. In this section, I argue that there is at least one scenario 
in which respectful listening requires a change in a confidence: when the 
listener in a context of disagreement is psychologically certain. In the next 
section, I outline the significance of this scenario for several debates in 
epistemology.
Consider a person who is psychologically certain that p. That is, he is so 
convinced that p that he is psychologically incapable of doubting that p, at 
least at the time of his certainty. One interesting consequence of psycholog-
ical certainty is that it involves the belief that there are no conceivable 
scenarios consistent with the person’s current beliefs in which p turns out to 
be false rather than true (at least not without altering the world in the rel-
evant respects). After all, if one believes that there are scenarios in which 
p turns out to be false, then p can be doubted.32 Furthermore, if the person 
believes that there are no scenarios in which p turns out to be false, then he 
will not think that there are any scenarios in which he would unexpectedly 
lower his confidence that p.33 For to countenance those scenarios, even if 
he could not describe them ahead of time, is to admit that there is a chance 
that p is not true, thus undermining psychological certainty that p. Now 
suppose that this person is listening to a speaker who is less than fully con-
fident that p. Can he satisfy the Openness Requirement? That is, can he 
maintain his certainty and simultaneously be open to unexpected confi-
dence changes that occur on the basis of what the speaker says? The answer 
is plausibly “no.” For to be open to such unexpected changes in confidence 
is to admit that there are scenarios in which he would become less confident 
that p. Insofar as he is psychologically certain that p, he cannot admit any 
such scenarios. Rather, listening to his interlocutor is, from his perspective, 
necessarily going to be an epistemic waste of time. After all, he thinks there 
32 This is one of the lessons of the First Meditation.
33 According to Bayesianism, for instance, if a person is certain that p, then they cease to 
contemplate the possibility that p is false. See, for example, Frankish (2009, 79).
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is nothing to learn that could change his confidence that p. Compare his 
attitude to that of your friend when you try to redeem yourself: “your 
attempt at redemption is necessarily a waste of time—you are guaranteed 
to remain what you are.” Both are inherently dismissive attitudes. This 
person therefore cannot listen with respect. And the reason he cannot listen 
with respect is because he cannot satisfy the Openness Requirement.
What can we glean from the fact that psychological certainty is incom-
patible with respectful listening? Most obviously, we can infer that—with 
one exception discussed below—if you want to listen with respect in the 
context of disagreement, you cannot be certain about any of the proposi-
tions that constitute the disagreement. This of course does not mean that 
respect is inconsistent with certainty. There are many things we are certain 
of that nobody disagrees about. For example, I am certain that I am not a 
two-dimensional entity, but I know of nobody who thinks that I am one.34 
Furthermore, many cases of apparent disagreement often are not cases of 
genuine disagreement. For example, many of my introductory students 
claim to believe that the proposition 2 + 2=4 is possibly false. But it inevi-
tably turns out that what they really believe is that “2 + 2=4” might be used 
to express something besides 2 + 2=4. If a disagreement is merely verbal, 
then certainty does not preclude respectful listening. Less obviously, we can 
infer that sometimes we can have a moral reason not to be certain, namely. 
when we listen to someone we disagree with (with one exception discussed 
below). By being certain, we close ourselves off to another person’s capacity 
for epistemic surprise. By closing ourselves off in this way, we fail to fully 
recognize that feature of a person which grounds their capacity to surprise, 
namely, their autonomy and uniqueness.
One might wonder that this result—that we can have a moral reason to 
lower our confidence—proves too much. After all, it seems that we some-
times have a moral duty not to be open to the possibility that we are mis-
taken. For example, it seems we have a moral duty not to be open to the 
possibility that the neo-Nazi is right in the views that earn him the name.35 
So an account of respectful listening would be suspect if it required that one 
be open to unexpected confidence changes when listening to a neo-Nazi. 
While I agree that such an account would be suspect, there are at least two 
34 Thanks to Jamie Fritz for this example.
35 The duty to not be so open might arise from a sense of self-respect, or respect for 
others, or potentially other sources. See Fritz (2018) for an argument in favor of nonopenness 
is these kinds of cases.
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reasons why my account is compatible with being steadfast in certain cir-
cumstances, including those involving neo-Nazis.
First, there is an important distinction between the following two ques-
tions: (i) What does respectful listening involve? and (ii) When are we 
required to listen to another person?36 We might make an analogous dis-
tinction in the context of basketball: (i) What does respectful playing involve? 
and (ii) When are we required to play basketball? Suppose I have a duty to 
play basketball respectfully anytime I play basketball. It does not follow that 
I have any reason to play basketball in the first place.37 The duty to play 
respectfully is a merely conditional duty. Likewise, suppose I have a moral 
reason to listen respectfully to anyone I listen to. It does not follow that I 
have a moral reason to listen to anyone. Maybe I do, but maybe I do not.38 
So, the following two claims are compatible: (i) one has moral reason to 
avoid certainty when listening in the context of disagreement and (ii) nobody 
has a reason, moral or otherwise, to listen to neo-Nazis.
This first response has its limits, however. Suppose that someone freely 
chooses to listen to a neo-Nazi, perhaps in an attempt at changing the 
neo-Nazi’s mind. Does this person have a moral reason to be open to unex-
pected confidence changes? The first response is impotent here, because the 
person has freely chosen to listen. The second response involves pointing 
out that some acts of respectful listening are self-undermining. Consider a 
person who asserts that she has no moral worth. If I were to listen respect-
fully to her, I would need to be open to unexpected changes in confidence 
with regards to her epistemic qualities. But in this case, that means being 
about to the possibility that she might be right, that she in fact has no moral 
worth. But the whole basis for my being open to this possibility lies in the 
fact that I think she does have moral worth. It is her moral worth that 
grounds her capacity to surprise, a capacity that grounds the need to be 
open to unexpected confidence change. Respectful listening in this case is 
self-undermining: by being open to the possibility of her being right, I 
undermine the very basis for being open to that possibility. The upshot is 
that I do not need to satisfy the Openness Requirement when I listen to her 
36 I have focused on the first question. Potential answers to the second include: that the 
person promised the speaker they would listen, that they stand in a relationship of reciprocity 
to the speaker, or that they stand in a special relationship with the speaker (such as being their 
parent).
37 One might make an analogy to jus in bello and jus ad bellum. Thanks to Justin Steinberg 
for this point.
38 Rini (2018) defends an imperfect duty of listening, for example. Heldke (2007) offers a 
Millian defense of the value of listening.
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assert that she has no moral worth. The same is true of the neo-Nazi. If he 
is asserting, as neo-Nazis are wont to assert, that some groups of people are 
less valuable than others, then he is making a claim that is at odds with the 
grounds of respectful listening: that people are autonomous and unique 
individuals worthy of respect. By being open to the possibility that the neo-
Nazi is right, the listener undermines the whole basis for listening in the first 
place. So, even if one opts, for whatever reason, to listen to a neo-Nazi, he 
is not required to be open to unexpected confidence change.39
So, while certainty generally leads to disrespectful listening, there are cir-
cumstances in which it is not disrespectful. Certainty in the face of the neo-
Nazi, for instance, is not disrespectful. But many of the people we disagree 
with are not neo-Nazis. The religious person on the floor below me is not 
a neo-Nazi, though I disagree with her about what the appropriate confi-
dence is regarding God’s existence. The same is true of metaphysicians who 
believe that debates about material objects are worthwhile philosophical 
debates. I disagree with them, but I do not think they are neo-Nazis. The 
same is even true of many (though not all) people I disagree with on polit-
ical matters. We disagree, but neither of us is a neo-Nazi. The Openness 
Requirement says nothing about whether I should or should not listen to 
any of these people. But it does say that when I do listen to them, for what-
ever reason, I need to open myself to the possibility that they surprise me 
with their epistemic qualities—even if I think those epistemic qualities are 
unimpressive at the time of listening. That is, I need to open myself up to 
unexpectedly coming my confidence.
Even this might worry some people, however. Are we really required to 
be open to the possibility that a flat-earther is right and Earth is not in fact 
round? Isn’t that deeply morally and epistemically irresponsible? At this 
point, we need to remember two things. First, questions about Earth’s 
shape are empirical questions. Most people are not certain about answers 
to empirical questions, and probably rightly so. So, there is no need to 
lower one’s (high) confidence that Earth is round when listening to a flat-
earther because it is already low enough to leave room for epistemic sur-
prise. The same applies to debates about most (or all) empirical questions. 
Second, the account I have defended is a pragmatist one insofar as it posits 
a nonepistemic reason for a given attitude: namely, it says that there can be 
a moral reason, arising out of the need to respect others, to be less than 
fully certain. So, in a sense it is recommending something epistemically 
39 This is compatible with the idea that nobody should attempt to listen respectfully to a 
neo-Nazi. See Fantl (2018) for arguments to this effect.
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irresponsible because it is offering a nonepistemic reason for attitude change. 
This is a feature it shares with other varieties of so-called “classical” prag-
matism, and a feature that distinguishes it from “intellectualist” positions 
that posit only epistemic factors as support for a given doxastic attitude.40 
Some will of course reject my account for that reason. But that is nothing 
specific to my account, but a feature of pragmatism more generally.41
4. THREE DEBATES
I want to end by highlighting three potential consequences that the 
Openness Requirement has for debates in contemporary epistemology. 
The first debate involves the relationship between moral and epistemic 
considerations for belief. There are times when epistemic rationality seems 
to require one doxastic attitude toward a particular proposition p, whereas 
morality seems to require an altogether different doxastic attitude toward p 
that is inconsistent with the first attitude. To use an oft cited and real life 
example described in Gendler:
Historian John Hope Franklin hosts a party at his Washington D.C. social club, 
The Cosmos Club. As Franklin reports, “It was during our stroll through the club 
that a white woman called me out, presented me with her coat check, and ordered 
me to bring her coat. I patiently told her that if she would present her coat to a 
uniformed attendant, “and all of the club attendants were in uniform,” perhaps 
she could get her coat.” Almost every attendant at the Cosmos Club is black and 
few members of the club are black. This demographic distribution almost certainly 
led to the woman’s false belief that Franklin is an attendant. 2011, 33
The woman seems to have epistemic reason, grounded in demographic 
distributions, to believe that Franklin is a coat attendant, but insofar as that 
belief is racist, she seems to also have moral reason not to believe that 
Franklin is a coat attendant. There are at least three kinds of positions on 
the interaction between these apparently competing epistemic and moral 
considerations. The first position—intellectualism—denies that there are 
any nonepistemic considerations for belief: if the evidence (or other 
truth-conducive considerations) supports a belief, then one ought to hold it. 
40 Classical pragmatism is here distinguished from varieties of pragmatic and moral en-
croachment views discussed above, which allow nonevidential considerations to affect thresh-
olds for justification without thereby functioning as reasons for a given attitude.
41 It might be important to point out that my account only posits reasons for confidence 
change and not for outright belief. Insofar as outright belief stands in a more direct relation-
ship to action, my account is not as vulnerable to claims of moral irresponsibility as other 
classically pragmatist positions are.
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The second position—classical pragmatism—allows that sometimes there 
are moral reasons to believe that p, which override any epistemic reasons 
not to believe that p.42 In other words, morality can require that we believe 
the irrational. The third position—the moral encroachment view—claims 
that epistemic reasons themselves can be altered, rather than merely 
trumped, by moral considerations (we discussed this view briefly in section 
2).43 But despite their differences, proponents of each position agree that 
moral considerations do not justify an alteration in one’s confidence, even if 
they affect whether a belief counts as justified.44 Confidence levels, in other 
words, are an entirely nonmoral affair.
But let us return to the psychologically certain person. Setting aside 
self-undermining cases like that of the neo-Nazi, our psychologically certain 
person has a moral reason to be open to epistemic surprise when he listens 
in the context of a disagreement. Openness to epistemic surprise requires 
an openness to unexpected changes in confidence. But he cannot be open 
to such changes so long as he is psychologically certain. So, he has a moral 
reason to lower his confidence level to below full certainty. If all this is right, 
then we have a moral consideration that is not merely a reason that affects 
a belief (e.g., a reason to withhold or initiate belief), but instead is a reason 
to lower one’s confidence level. To be clear, the reason to lower his confi-
dence level is not an epistemic reason (though he might have those as well). 
It is not as if the Openness Requirement is an inductive notion: “I’ve been 
surprised by people before, so there’s a chance that this person will surprise 
me—I better be prepared.” Rather, one can have all the epistemic reason 
to think that a particular person is not capable of causing an unexpected 
confidence change. But one cannot listen respectfully to such a person while 
at the same time maintaining their certainty.45
This consequence—that we can have a moral reason to lower confidence 
levels—extends to a second debate in epistemology: the debate over whether 
42 See James (1896), Baker (1987), Stroud (2006), Aiken (2008), and Preston-Roedder 
(2013) for examples.
43 See Moss (2018) and Gardiner (2018) for overviews of the moral encroachment debate. 
Recent defenses of moral encroachment include, but are not limited to, Basu (2019), 
Schroeder (2018), Basu and Schroeder (2019), Pace (2011), Bolinger (2018), and Fritz (2017). 
Gardiner (2018) lists a potential fourth account, namely, one which denies that there is, in 
cases of conflict, an all-things-considered reason for belief. Gendler (2011) plausibly falls 
under this heading.
44 Much of the literature is framed in terms of the threshold of belief. Moss (2018), how-
ever, argues that moral encroachment might affect when a credence is justified (though 
without affecting the credence itself).
45 There is of course the issue of whether a person can control her doxastic attitudes, 
including credence levels. But I set that issue aside here.
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the fact of disagreement with an epistemic peer ought to diminish one’s 
confidence in the relevant propositions.46 So-called “steadfasters” say no: 
disagreement is consistent with maintained confidence. So-called “concilia-
tionists” say yes: disagreement requires a revision in the direction of the 
peer’s confidence. But the debate centers on whether disagreement provides 
an epistemic reason to adjust one’s confidence, for example, whether the fact 
of disagreement is evidence that one’s opponent is right. If the Openness 
Requirement holds, then the fact of disagreement can require a moral rea-
son to adjust one’s confidence. More specifically, the fact that another 
person—even someone who is not an epistemic peer!—disagrees with you 
can give you a moral reason to lower your confidence, so long as you are 
certain that you are right. For example, if I am certain that utilitarianism is 
false and I choose to listen to my utilitarian colleague, then I have a moral 
reason to adjust my confidence level toward hers. The Openness 
Requirement therefore provides some unexpected moral support for 
conciliationism.
Finally, there is a debate about whether it is possible for a belief to be 
epistemically faultless and yet morally blameworthy. Classical pragmatists—
who believe that moral reasons for belief can trump epistemic reasons—
admit that the epistemically faultless person can be morally blameworthy. 
For example, the spouse who believes her partner is cheating might be 
epistemically faultless but nonetheless morally blameworthy for not giving 
her partner the benefit of the doubt.47 But others deny this possibility. For 
example, supporters of moral encroachment argue that the spouse is not 
epistemically faultless because the fact that the supposed cheater is her part-
ner raises the threshold for the belief’s justification, a threshold she has not 
reached in this case.48 If the Openness Requirement holds, then there is at 
least one situation in which a person can be epistemically faultless and yet 
morally blameworthy. Namely: the epistemically certain person who in virtue 
of her certainty is also psychologically certain. A person is epistemically 
certain when her doxastic attitude has the highest possible epistemic sta-
tus.49 But if the epistemically and psychologically certain person listens to a 
person she disagrees with and yet does not lower her confidence, then her 
confidence is morally blameworthy despite its impeccable epistemic status.
46 See Frances and Matheson (2018) and Christensen (2009) for overviews of the 
debate.
47 The example of from Schroeder (2018).
48 See, for instance, Schroeder (2018) and Basu and Schroeder (2019).
49 Depending on one’s view of certainty, not all cases of epistemic certainty will involve 
psychological certainty. See Reed (2011) for discussion.
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5. CONCLUSION
Let me remind the reader what I have argued for in this paper. First, I 
argued that respectful listening must track the bases of respect in a person 
and that two bases of respect—autonomy and uniqueness—involve a capac-
ity for a person to surprise others in myriad ways. Second, I argued that 
one important form of surprise is epistemic surprise, namely, the unex-
pected improved evaluation of a person’s epistemic qualities. Respectful 
listening must therefore track this capacity for epistemic surprise. This was 
the Openness Requirement. Third, I argued for a particular interpretation 
of the Openness Requirement: a listener can track the capacity for epis-
temic surprise only by being open to unexpected changes in her confidence 
levels that result from what the speaker says. Fourth, I argued that the 
Openness Requirement entails that a psychologically certain person cannot 
listen with respect. Finally, I argued that the Openness Requirement has 
consequences for at least three debates in epistemology: the debate over the 
relationship between moral and epistemic considerations, the disagreement 
debate, and the debate over epistemic blame and its connection to moral 
blame. I admit that I might be wrong about some, or all, of these conclu-
sions. Regardless, I hope to have shown that the phenomenon of listening 
has potentially important consequences for epistemology.50
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